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              MY BEGINNINGS 
 
Could I have had different parents? In practice, no, but in principle, yes. And could I 
have been born at a different time? Again, in practice no, but in principle, yes. These 
are, perhaps, common sense verdicts on such questions. But they go against what may 
be seen as some prevailing philosophical orthodoxies. I defend versions of the 
common sense verdicts, and argue against the orthodoxies, here. These arguments are 
neither technical nor particularly complex. What I want to suggest here is that these 
rather ordinary questions are best answered by rather ordinary means.1 
 
     I 
Start with timing. Lucretius, in support of the Epicurean view about death, notes an 
asymmetry in our attitudes to non-existence. On the face of it there are two ways of 
extending life, either by dying later, or by being born earlier. And yet for the most 
part we fuss only about the one. Why is this? 
 The puzzle here has excited some recent debate, and a number of responses. 
One has it that although we could indeed have been born earlier this is just of no 
interest to us – we’re generally indifferent to the past, and care only for the present 
and the future. So life still to come, and its ending, is what matters to us, while life 
behind us, and the more of that we could have had, is of no concern.2  Whether or not 
it works here, a notable feature of this approach is to distinguish between what is 
possible for us, and what in fact we care about.  A more familiar approach is to 
address issues about possibility head on – we could die later, but we couldn’t have 
been born earlier.  This can indeed seem right. It seems clear that death, on many 
occasions, need not have occurred, and that had it not occurred, the very same person 
would have lived on. But how could I, this very person, have been born earlier? 
Surely someone born earlier would have been someone else.  And so an earlier birth 
isn’t, in fact, any real possibility for me. 
 There is widespread support for such a view. And much of this support derives 
from views about the necessity of origin. Take Parfit’s position. He insists that as a 
matter of fact, none of us could have been conceived much earlier or later than the 
time when we were actually conceived.3 And this because if that time is altered by as 
much as a month, a different sperm and a different egg will be involved. Given this 
wholesale exchange of the originating material then, inevitably, a different person will 
come into existence. So even though I could fairly clearly have been born a few days 
earlier or later, and arguably could as well have been conceived a few days earlier or 
later, my beginnings are otherwise fixed. Notice that the argument here pulls together 
both questions with which I began. Insisting on the necessity of originating material 
fixes both our parents, and the time at which we are born.  
 The argument is plainly defective, however. There is just no reason, on the 
grounds given here, for thinking that we could not have been conceived at a 
substantially different time. Both sperm and egg can be frozen, and their union 
delayed.  And we could of course have been born at a different time. For the embryo 
itself can be frozen, and its development delayed.  Nor is there a way out in noting 
here Parfit’s caution, and his insistence on what is in fact true, rather than what is 
necessarily true.  He clearly thinks that even if it is logically possible for someone to 
be conceived much later than they were, this isn’t physically possible. But it is. And it 
is physically possible, too, for someone to be born much later than they were. The 
requisite technologies haven’t been around for long. People born a hundred years ago 
couldn’t, as things stand, have been frozen as embryos, and born later. But things 
could have stood differently. The technologies could have been developed earlier.  
That too is physically possible. And earlier births, earlier conceptions are similarly 
possible. There may well be people born in 2150 who, had materials not been frozen, 
would have been born in 2050. So reliance on origin claims, where the question of 
timing is concerned, isn’t going to work. We’ll need to look elsewhere. 
  
     II 
Many people think it’s clear that none of us could have been born at a substantially 
different time. Someone born a hundred years earlier, whatever the history of their 
originating material, would, they say, have been a different person, someone else, not 
me. I think this is right. And, as a friend of the psychological account of personal 
identity, I argue thus: psychological continuity and connectedness matter to identity – 
if there are abrupt and extreme changes here, then identity is forfeited. A strange thing 
happens one night. My physical form is unchanged while mentally things are 
altogether different, with, or so it appears, near total amnesia, and a wholly different 
character and dispositions. Suppose too that there’s an antipathy to my real name, and 
the person here insists on being known as Bill. And so it remains until death. My 
death, or Bill’s? The alterations here are sudden and profound. And arguably the best 
way to describe what happens is to acknowledge that I cease to exist when they occur, 
and that Bill dies later, when the body we shared gives out. 
 Suppose a mid-life change is in this way identity destroying. Then, surely, 
development from the outset along radically different lines is identity denying. 
Suppose, as I believe, and evidence from twins notwithstanding, that much of my 
psychological life is a product of environment, rather than nature. I have just the one 
brother. As a one day old baby my brother’s brother is given for adoption to a 
Japanese family. This child eats fish, speaks Japanese, wrestles sumo. I want to say 
that if this had happened then I would never have existed.4 Consider not place, but 
time. Cryonics works. As a new born baby my brother’s brother is taken from his 
parents, frozen for two hundred years, with life to be continued late in the 22nd 
century. Again, I wouldn’t exist, were this to be true.  
 What I want to insist on in such cases, then, is that material identity is in no 
way sufficient for personal identity. A particular human body can, serially, be the 
habitat of different people. And particular hunks of originating material – separately 
the sperm and egg, or together the embryo – can develop into different people. But 
more important than noting the claims here is to note that my argument with those 
taking a contrary view is, as I understand it, far from deep. We’ll agree, surely, about 
at least almost all the facts involved – in the first case, about the persistence of the 
human body, the degree of psychological difference over the change, the attitudes and 
reactions of those involved; in the second, about the variant histories for the same 
originating material, the profound differences between the emerging psychologies, 
and again the concerns that most of us have for the persistence (more or less, and 
allowing for gradual change) of the psychologies we have now. And we’ll agree, too, 
about the range of opinions aired on the identity questions in such cases, with some 
saying, as I do, that different, others that the same, people are involved. Still this is 
agreement about almost, and so not yet all the facts because we still disagree, 
apparently, on which of these opinions are correct, and so disagree about the facts of 
identity. 
 But is this right? Certainly we might imagine such facts – facts about the 
unchanging spirit or soul or essence of the person involved, something perhaps 
temporarily veiled, emerging in an afterlife.  Yet I doubt their existence. And 
relatively few of those arguing with me will rest their case on alleged facts like these. 
If that were the issue, then disagreement between me and my opponents would be 
both straightforward and profound. Others may think there are some sorts of 
metaphysical facts, perhaps even more obscure, less accessible, than these alleged 
spiritual facts, and that identity questions rest on these. But here it isn’t so much 
ordinary doubt as an inability, on my part, even to comprehend what sorts of things 
these metaphysical facts would be. Setting this aside, what are we left with? Either no 
facts at all, or facts of a non-standard, even if not unfamiliar kind. I think it’s the 
latter. What I want to suggest then, is that there is defensible disagreement here, and 
that it centres on what best to say about some non-standard or puzzling situation in 
which matters of identity are involved. And  - and this is why the need for  
technicalities is thin –  what best to say is in large part decided not by abstruse 
metaphysical speculation but rather by attending to what reasonably informed  people 
do and will say. Get the ordinary level facts right, think through at least their 
immediate implications, take account of our related interests and concerns, and then 
see whether some sort of consensus might emerge.5  
 So it isn’t appropriate here simply to duck the issue, and deny that there are 
any facts at all where such questions are concerned. This might appear an option. It 
could be said that in these circumstances the same body continues, the same material 
develops, but that the personalities involved are effectively distinct. Certainly we can 
agree thus far. But can we agree that that is the end of the matter? It seems to me that 
the ordinary questions, Will I survive? Would I have been born? cannot in this way be 
sidestepped. Such questions get asked, and because our concerns are so much, and so 
understandably, focussed on psychology, their best answers, in the sorts of cases 
outlined here are, or so I believe, no. And this answer is tempered, or provisional, just 
because if, as I maintain, it hangs on the direction of ordinary conversation then there 
is no special authority attaching here to philosophical expertise.  
 There is a further point to be made here. It might be objected that on the 
psychological account of personal identity none of us ever born. Rather, we come into 
existence some time after birth. And so there is simply no question of our being born 
at a different time. But there are two components to a reply. First, – and this is line 
with the comments above – I don’t claim that there are, as well as human organisms, 
some distinct non-physical entities, persons, and that we are these persons. For that 
would be, apparently, a substantive and controversial claim, and one clearly at odds 
with ordinary views.6 All I claim is that everyday references to ourselves and to others 
typically foreground psychology – on such arcane matters as to whether ‘person’ is a 
substance or phase sortal everyday views are, and defensibly, silent.7 Second, even 
were I to claim this, the substance of my view here would be unscathed.  For even if 
persons are distinct from their bodies, the relation is such that if the body were to be 
born at a substantially different time, then a different person would (although 
somewhat later) begin to exist.  Born or not, I couldn’t have come into existence at a 
substantially different time. 
 
     III 
Kripke’s claims about the necessity of origin are well known. So too is the rhetoric 
Could this woman have been a swan? Could this very table, this wooden lectern, 
(banging, no doubt, on the lectern at the time) have been made of ice? Who could 
think, who could dare, so absurd a thing? Of course she couldn’t have been a swan. 
And of course this table and a table made of ice could hardly be one and the same. 
Our intuitions about such cases are robust. 
 The claims here differ from Parfit’s in two respects. The principle they allude 
to – ‘If a material object has its origin from a certain hunk of matter, it could not have 
had its origin in any other matter’8 - is perfectly general, applying to things as well as 
to people. And they deal with what is strongly necessary, rather than what must in fact 
be the case. Given this generality, this ambition, the principle is hardly 
uncontroversial, and its consonance with everyday opinion hardly thoroughgoing.  
Not only could the table not have been made of ice, but, according to Kripke, it 
couldn’t have been made of a different hunk of wood.9  Suppose that it’s made, not 
from planks, but from fibreboard. It couldn’t have been made from different sheets. 
Or consider a vase, and its origin in a particular ball of clay. The potter’s assistant 
prepares balls of clay, and has them ready in a bin. He’s asked for a ball, and takes 
one, more or less at random. But the vase the potter makes depends on just which ball 
he’s given. A different ball, and it’s a different vase. Many will find such claims hard 
to believe.   
 What makes for the difference between the persuasive and the less persuasive 
cases? In the former the proposed changes in originating material will generate 
substantial differences further on. A swan woman, an ice table, will be significantly 
different from women and tables of a more familiar kind.10 There may well be 
differences in numerical identity, but there are certainly differences in qualitative 
identity in instances like these.  But with a different block of wood, a different ball of 
clay, these qualitative differences are negligible, to say the least. And it isn’t 
immediately easy to see why, when everything that matters to us remains the same, 
we should accept that we are, in these circumstances, faced with a different thing. 
 These concerns about the origin principle derive from everyday intuitions 
about identity. Another challenge comes from philosophical speculation. The sceptic 
sometimes has it that, for all we know, the world might have popped into existence 
five minutes ago.  I think I have this substantial history, but I could be wrong. Yet if 
the origin principle is right then this way of putting things is at best misleading. If the 
world came into existence five minutes ago then hardly any of the stuff that I think 
exists really does exist. Other stuff, with different origins, exists in its place. And of 
course this goes for me too. I am not the person I think I am. This isn’t just a figure of 
speech – it isn’t simply the overturning of some contingent fact about me. Rather, as 
we’re dealing here with necessities, then not having these beginnings, this history, 
makes for a real difference in identity. And this may seem an unpalatable 
consequence of the origin principle. 
 Persuasive and palatable or not, Kripke’s principle may nevertheless be true. 
Is it? Before deciding, consider, and guard against, a pair of possible confusions. 
 Distinguish, first, between concerns with a thing’s beginnings or origins, and 
with developments or changes it may, later in the course of its history, undergo. The 
question isn’t whether the queen could turn into a swan, or have gone through a swan 
stage at some earlier period.  Similarly.. ‘..the question of whether the table could 
have changed into ice is irrelevant here. The question whether the table could 
originally have been made of anything other than wood is relevant’.11 
 The distinction between these questions is reasonably straightforward. 
Nevertheless I want to say a bit more about it.  
 While there are many believers in the necessity of origin, no one believes in a 
corresponding necessity regarding change. No one thinks that change is impossible. 
And no one thinks that if an object changes in any respect it becomes ipso facto a 
different thing. A thing’s origin may well be fixed, but its later development is to 
some degree open. But now about these later changes we can ask two sorts of 
questions. First, what sorts, and degree of change are possible? And (here only to 
sketch an account) we might want to consider limitations on change imposed by 
technology, by physics, or by logic. Could the queen turn into a swan? We don’t have 
the equipment, but it may be physically possible, and certainly logic won’t prevent it. 
Second, which of these possible changes are identity threatening? And in the present 
context this question has two parts, concerning both individuals, and kinds.  So one 
question is, if a such and such changes in this or that way, would it still be a such and 
such? Another is, if this particular such and such changes in this or that way would it 
still be this particular such and such?  Suppose the queen turns, magically, into a swan 
or, less magically, into a pile of ash. I take it that if this happens she ceases to exist.  A 
swan, even more ash, is neither a person nor this particular person, the queen.12  But if 
the wood changes to ice there is still a table in existence. And we may well want to 
say it’s the same table. We may well decide, that is, that being made of wood isn’t 
among the table’s essential properties.13  
 The questions here differ in an important respect. Those focussing on change 
are, in principle at least, easy enough to answer, limited only by our grasp of the 
relevant scientific or technological facts, or some basic logical principles. But 
questions of identity are clearly much less straightforward, and their answers given 
neither by ordinary appeal to material facts, or by appeal to more or less transparent 
notion of what is logically possible, or logically necessary. As before, I want to deny 
that there are any complex metaphysical issues in play here, and to suggest instead 
that what, reflectively, we do say determines what we should say. Often this is 
straightforward – a pile of ash is not a queen. Often, too, there is nothing we do say, 
nothing that strikes us as right to say, and so nothing in particular that we should say. 
But in other cases contrasting intuitions are brought into play, and there’s often 
benefit to be had, progress to be made in teasing these out and aiming at a stable and 
shared position.14  
 A further point to bring out here is a respect in which Kripke’s position is 
seemingly more reticent and reserved than Parfit’s. His origin principle makes no 
claim about sufficiency – it says only that particulars couldn’t have different origins, 
not that originating materials must develop into these particulars. And this is surely 
right. The clay might have remained in the bin, the plank might have been used for 
firewood, and the sperm and egg might never have been introduced. But Parfit, in 
contrast, wants to articulate and employ the notion of a distinctive necessary property, 
as one that a given person couldn’t have lacked, and that only that person could have 
had. And on his version of the origin principle, ‘each person has this distinctive 
necessary property, that of having grown from the particular pair of cells from which 
this person in fact grew’.15 This isn’t a sufficiency claim but it is something close, 
implying not that I had to develop from my embryo, but that if anyone developed 
from the embryo, that person would be me. This claim needs amending, as is widely 
recognised, to deal with the case of twins, but that apart is it plausible? Parfit appears 
to think so, and Kripke seems in some places to agree.16 But the claim has no 
plausibility for most physical objects – even if the clay is used to make a vase, it 
seems clear it could make a number of different vases – and is less than clearly 
plausible even for human beings. Grant that I am not identical with the originating 
material, and grant that this material could encounter various vicissitudes, both natural 
and artificial, during its early days, there seems no reason to suppose that from it, only 
one person could result.17 Reservations about Parfit’s claim here need to be 
distinguished from the point made above about different psychologies. It’s one thing 
to think if that if the body remains the same, or develops in strongly similar ways, 
then in spite of psychological differences, the person remains the same. It’s another to 
think that however both the body and mind develop, the person remains the same. I 
reject both views, but the first is the more defensible. 
 
     IV 
What is disallowed, on the Kripkean view, is that the queen should have started out 
not as a royal sperm and egg, but as some swan. Anything starting as a swan, however 
queenly it later becomes, would not be this woman. What is allowed, however, is that 
soon after her birth the queen should have magically turned into a swan, and then 
remained a swan until the middle of last week, or even later, before becoming the 
queen again.18  That represents a possible history, even if only a logically possible 
history, of this woman. And now someone might wonder how this difference in 
timing can be so critical. Why hang so much on those first moments? And why, 
beyond those cases where it seems intuitively plausible, accept this origin principle? 
Doubly tentative, Kripke maintains that it is ‘perhaps susceptible of something like a 
proof’:  
 Let ‘B’ be a name (rigid designator) of a table, let ‘A’ name the piece of wood 
from which it actually came. Let ‘C’ name another piece of wood. Then 
suppose B were made from A, as in the actual world, but also another table D 
were simultaneously made from C…. Now in this situation B ≠ D; hence, even 
if D were made by itself, and no table were made from A, D would not be B.19 
 
This is certainly compressed, but the gist isn’t too hard to discern. 
 Someone opposed to the origin principle suggests that our table, although in 
fact made from A, could as easily have been made from C.  But then if that’s even 
half way right, the objection goes, we can surely imagine a situation where there are 
two tables, effectively indistinguishable, made from the two pieces of wood.  Suppose 
this, and we’re supposing our original table to exist, with, alongside it, a duplicate 
table.20 These tables, though (virtually) qualitatively identical are numerically distinct. 
They’re different tables. But then suppose that only the duplicate is made. Whatever it 
looks like, whatever bill it fits, it’s still not the original table.  That, in this situation, 
remains unmade.  
 Focus on this argument, and it becomes clearer, I think, why the two cases – 
starting as a swan, becoming a swan – which above I suggested might seem similar 
are in fact importantly different.  Standardly, in considering whether something might 
have had, at some stage, a different history we trace back the actual history of that 
thing to a certain point, and then consider divergences, thus: 
(I) 
  E ____________(___________________________) Q 
       
              
             
             S 
Here the solid line represents an object’s history in the actual world, the dotted line an 
alternative and merely possible history.21 The bracketed section of the solid line 
represents that part of the object’s actual history that won’t occur, should the 
branching take place. Given that there is no question that some sorts of change are 
possible, the issue here is whether the resulting object should best be described as the 
same or different, as a development for the same object, or as its transformation into a 
different kind of thing, or a different individual. And it may be, of course, that for 
some part of its history the object represented by the dotted line still is the same object 
as that on the solid, while at a later stage its identity, as we will say, changes. So 
suppose the questions here are whether Elizabeth, who in the actual world remains 
queenly, first, could instead have become swanlike and, second, whether that 
swanlike creature would have been her, Elizabeth, or something else. But then 
questions about origins seem not to be like this. Here we’re asking whether this actual 
object, say with all its current features intact, could have started its existence from a 
different, and somewhat differently featured,  lump of stuff. So, utilising the 
convention above, the question is whether Elizabeth, who actually developed from 
human material, could instead have developed from swan material. Supporters of the 
origin principle think that the most you might get from swan material, even when the 
human material is unused, is a replica of Elizabeth, and not Elizabeth herself. They 
think, then, that in contrast to (I) the situation pictured in (II) doesn’t represent any 
genuinely coherent possibility. 
(II) 
H (______________________)__________ E 
        
       
     S  
 
There is, however, a puzzle here. Represented thus, the situations considered here do 
look to be symmetrical, with the origins issue the mirror image of that concerning 
development. And as branching out is possible, so too is closing in. But there seem to 
be factors counting against this. There’s the direction of time to take into account, and 
the effects that might introduce. Perhaps coming together is harder than coming apart. 
There are the widespread differences in intuition about these cases. For certainly most 
people find the idea that things might have different origins much more puzzling that 
they might later develop in different ways. A thought here might be that as in (II) 
there are clearly two distinct lumps of material, the most we can get, from the second 
lump, is a replica of the target object. But in (I) there’s only the one lump and 
questions only as to how it might change. And then connected with this there’s 
Kripke’s ‘something like a proof’ urging us to hold the replica or duplicate view, as 
against the possibility of different origins for the one thing supposedly pictured in (II). 
Nevertheless, the symmetry of structure here remains notable, and it surely isn’t yet 




     V 
My focus is on persons. And there are striking similarities between Kripke’s argument 
here, and one used by Bernard Williams against the psychological criterion of 
personal identity. Charles claims, suddenly, to be Guy Fawkes, knows a lot about the 
17th century, acts like a Catholic and a plotter. Has he become Guy? Williams points 
out that if this can happen to one to person, it can happen to two. Suppose it does. 
Robert makes a similar claim, and is similarly plausible. As these two are manifestly 
non-identical, so they can’t both be Guy. But there are no reasons to favour the claims 
of one over the other. The best thing, then, is to reject both claims, and to maintain the 
familiar view - bodily continuity is necessary for identity.22 
 Yet it’s objected that the situation Williams asks us to entertain doesn’t exist. 
There aren’t two claimants – just the one. So there’s no clear reason to prevent 
Charles’ claim from going through. Williams counters that Robert’s making his case 
brings about no alteration in Charles’ relation to Guy, and so has no bearing on the 
force of his claim. And so the fact that there could be two equally good candidates is 
enough to dismiss the claims of the actual one. 
 Something like this is going on in Kripke’s argument. Here too the possibility 
of duplicates or multiples undermines the case for variant origins even when only one 
item – table, vase, person – will be actual. And here too a disagreement about identity 
– should we stress body or psychology, should we stress origins or qualities? – is 
resolved in favour of the more material of the two views. Of course there are 
differences between the cases –Williams’ concerns the relations between individuals, 
whereas Kripke’s focuses on individuals and their origins. Further (and I return to this 
below) Charles and Robert make equally strong claims to be Guy – and hence the 
failure of both, whereas when there are two tables their claims to be the original table 
B can easily be ranked – and hence the failure of the duplicate. Yet in spite of these 
differences the similarities are pronounced enough to suggest that linking them might 
bring gains. 
 Both Williams and Kripke want to insist on the distinction between (near) 
exact similarity and identity. They might both be happy with Parfit’s comment here, 
‘….exact similarity is not numerical identity, as is shown by any two exactly similar 
things’.23 But while it’s clear that Charles and Robert, no matter how similar, are 
numerically distinct, and clear too that in a situation involving pairs of tables the 
second is not the first, it is less clear, surely, either that Charles hasn’t become Guy, or 
that the second table, that made from C, isn’t the first, when only the one man, or the 
one table, exists.24 And something like Nozick’s closest continuer account of identity 
can be brought to bear on both cases – Charles becomes Guy, at least when his claim 
is both strong and unchallenged by duplicates,25 and the table made from C is B, in 
the situation where it strongly resembles B and block A is unused. What such a move 
requires, of course, is that we remain unimpressed by the underlying claim here – 
explicit elsewhere in Williams,26 only implicit in Kripke – that identity rests upon 
intrinsic features alone.  For in both cases, clearly, the identity claim would be 
abandoned, were a compelling rival to appear. But we should remain unimpressed. 
For it isn’t an intrinsic feature of anything that it is unique. And so if identity over 
time depends on the absence of duplicates, and at the same time on intrinsic features 
alone, there is no such identity.27 But surely there is such identity, and once again I 
want to suggest that it obtains just when reasonably informed people say it obtains. 
And it’s unsurprising, surely, that what they say here will vary with the existence of 
duplicate and near-duplicate candidates, and so unsurprising that something like 
Nozick’s account is correct.28  
 That said, there remains a stronger objection to Kripke’s argument that, 
although hinted at, still needs to be made explicit. The question he asks is whether a 
particular thing could have had different origins, and not whether one thing might 
somehow be another, different, thing. It is, then, the question of whether table B 
might have been made from either A or C, and not whether table D might somehow 
be table B when block A is unused.29 Imagine – and this is something the ‘proof’ 
doesn’t rule out – that B and D are qualitatively very different tables. Now clearly D 
isn’t B when piece A is unused, and nothing looking like B exists. But in considering 
whether B might have been made not from A but C we need to consider worlds where 
C is differently used, and used in such a way as to render plausible the suggestion that 
it’s been made into B. The difference between Williams’ and Kripke’s arguments is 
relevant here. Where two tables are made there are inevitably some differences, at the 
least concerning location, between them. Remove just the one table, leaving all else 
the same, and these differences remain. There can be no grounds for thinking the 
second table has become, as if magically, the first. But although there are differences 
between Charles and Robert, there are just no differences in the strength of their 
claims to be Guy. They cancel one another. Remove either candidate, and the claim of 
the remaining might go through.30 
  
     VI 
Could I have had a different father?  Most of us will say no. Both parents matter. 
Change either, or both, and you get a different child. If my mother had married a 
different man, I’d never have existed.  
 Notice, however, that there is no support for this widely held view from 
Kripke’s near- proof. What thrust there is to that depend on our being able to imagine 
a world with two separate hunks of matter, and two objects derived therefrom.  It 
targets tables made from particular hunks of wood, children developing from 
particular zygotes, vases thrown from particular balls of clay. But consider a situation 
involving the same egg, and different sperm. Given that the egg isn’t itself divisible, 
there isn’t a possible world containing two complex hunks of matter, and two 
subsequent children. So the duplicate puzzle won’t emerge. Yet most of those 
confident that they couldn’t have two different parents are equally confident they 
couldn’t have one different parent.31 
 Why do we believe we couldn’t have different parents? It’s unlikely to be on 
the basis of Kripke’s argument. That, recent and subtle, will hardly explain this 
mature and proletarian belief. And why do we believe we couldn’t have a different 
father? The argument does no work at all here. But both beliefs are strong. And they 
are easily enough explained. We know too much about biology. We know that a 
different father would produce a substantially different child. Both the sperm and egg 
contain important genetic material. Change either, and the character of the resulting 
embryo will be significantly altered. And this is crucial. We think that someone 
substantially different from the outset, both physiologically and psychologically, 
would be a different person. An alteration to either parent would, as we truly believe, 
be sufficient for such alteration. And so my parents are necessary for me. Lacking 
either, I wouldn’t exist.  
 Suppose the biological facts are different. Sperm is needed, and sperm differs. 
But which sperm is used makes no discernible difference to the resulting child. The 
genetic material is contained in the egg alone. Then I could have had a different 
father. Suppose the difference is greater. Parents are needed to produce embryos. But 
these are all the same. They’re delivered to the laboratory where, in accordance with 
the government blueprint, scientists manipulate them so that the requisite sorts of 
children are produced. Then I could have had different parents. 
 
     VII 
Consider two objections, one full-blooded, the other suggesting a compromise. 
 Suppose, as above, that embryos are all the same. And suppose that I say, 
because of this, I could have had different parents – the sperm and egg from which I 
developed could have been different from the ones actually employed. And I might 
have existed either way. But now consider an intermediate stage. Will I say that the 
embryo from which I developed could itself have developed from different material, 
or that I could have developed from different embryos? I’ll need one or the other, but 
it may seem that neither is particularly attractive. Could this very embryo, so closely 
related to the sperm and egg, have had entirely different origins?  That may seem hard 
to believe. But if so, then I have to claim that I could have developed from different 
embryos. So consider a further stage – could the one fetus have developed from these 
different embryos, or could I have developed from different fetuses? And so on. 
Somewhere or other there needs to be a break in identity. And it is problematic 
wherever it occurs.  
 But go back to the diagrams. Whatever problem there is here occurs just as 
readily with branching out as with closing in.  I could have a fairly standard future 
ahead of me, or I could turn, magically and gradually, into a swan. Suppose this 
happens. The swan isn’t me. Yet there may well be no answer to the question of 
exactly when I cease to exist, and so no answer to exactly where on the dotted line the 
rupture to identity takes place. Equally, there may be no answer to the question of 
exactly when two possible embryos would become the one human being.  And neither 
of these versions of the sorites problem is as troublesome as it might first appear. 
 The compromise move, similarly, lacks real force.  Think again about that 
response to Lucretius I mentioned earlier. Brueckner and Fischer suggest that we want 
a later death, but not an earlier birth, because we are inevitably future directed. The 
past just doesn’t interest us. Now what is wrong here is simply the factual claim about 
what our interests are. We do care about the past. Sometimes we wish things had 
happened differently. Often we’re content that things happened as they did. And we 
recognise that it’s only because the past had its particular shape that things are as they 
are today.  And so this response to Lucretius fails.32 Nevertheless, it may be thought 
that foregrounding interests, while setting metaphysical speculation to one side is, 
over a range of issues, a profitable move. Parfit, famously, wants to separate questions 
of identity, strictly understood, from those concerning what matters to us, what we 
care about, in survival. And it might be suggested that I should avail myself of just 
this distinction here, conceding that differences in material makes for a difference in 
objects, even while pointing out that this might not be of concern to us. A table made 
from a different block of wood might be as good as the original table, and were there 
to be no distinctive genetic material in the sperm and egg, it wouldn’t much matter to 
us who our parents were. Even so, numerical identity remains distinct – change the 
wood, and there’s a different table, change the parents, and there’s a different child. 
But there is no good argument for this. All that is uncontroversial here is that if the 
originating material is different then a pair of objects, one of them actual, the other 
merely possible, are not in all respects the same. That is true for a similar pair of 
objects, again one actual, the other possible, when we consider any change within an 
object’s lifetime. Yet as mid-life change needn’t threaten identity, so too, as far as I 
can tell, for change at the outset.  And this isn’t to bring metaphysics back into the 
picture, but rather to deny that there is some deep notion of identity, distinct from 
what an acknowledgement of our interests will cause us to say about it. 
 
     VIII 
Could I have been born at a quite different time? In practice no, but in principle yes. 
Change significantly the time of birth and so much will be different. I think, that 
person wouldn’t be me. None of what matters to me, and indeed to others, would 
survive. That it could truly be said that the person born then would have developed, 
just as certainly as I have developed, from a particular sperm and egg cuts no ice. As I 
see no reason to believe that only one person can develop from given material, so I 
see no reason to think that the person who does develop, whatever he is like, must be 
me. Even so, we can imagine some arcane situation where someone today is born into 
a closed, controlled and easily replicated environment. But then imagine the embryo 
is frozen instead, the replica constructed, with birth and development taking place two 
hundred years hence.  The person born then would issue from the same originating 
material and would be physically and psychologically the same as the person who, 
without freezing, would be born today. It would be the same person.33 
 Could I have had different parents? In practice no, but in principle, yes. As a 
matter of fact the complex information contained within the genetic material of both 
sperm and egg determines most of my physical and some of my psychological make 
up. Change one or both parents, and a profoundly dissimilar person will result. That 
person wouldn’t be me.  Even so, we can imagine the situation to be different, and for 
the originating material to be effectively inert – human sperm and egg produce 
children rather than swans, but these children are all the same until the environment 
gives them some shape. Were that to be the case – and unlike the previous example 






   NOTES AND REFERENCES 
  
                                               
1
 It is worth noting that Kripke, one of my main targets here, himself repeatedly appeals to everyday 
intuition in support of his views. This is clear even within the preface to Naming and Necessity 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980) 
2
 See Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer, ‘Why is Death Bad?’ Philosophical Studies 50 
(1986) pp. 213-23, ‘The Asymmetry of Early Death and Late Birth’ Philosophical Studies 71 (1993) 
pp. 327-331, and ‘Death's Badness’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993) pp. 37-45  
3
  Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1984) pp. 351-2. 
4
 Parfit might appear to take a different view.  In endnote 6 (p.522-3) he resists the claims of those who 
say, of such cases, that different persons are involved. But in fact the case he considers – moving to 
Italy at age 3 – is importantly different from mine. Wholly different psychologies are one thing, 
branching psychologies with common origins another. 
5
 Though they can be taken only so far, there are, I think, parallels here with the situation in ethics. 
While some versions of realism are shaky – there are no free-standing moral facts as such – we might 
still want to insist that given our constitutions, interests, psychologies etc., it is still true that some 
things are right, others wrong. 
                                                                                                                                       
6
 See Jeff McMahan, ‘The Metaphysics of Brain Death’  Bioethics 9 (1995) pp.91-126 for a detailed 
defence of a mind based account of personhood. Two things are notable. First, McMahan develops his 
– as he admits - highly counterintutitive positon in an attempt to follow through on what he takes to be 
an intuitively appealing starting point. Second, in the introduction to The Ethics of Killing (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) he acknowledges that these highly refined views on identity are about 
the least satisfactory elements of his work. 
7
 It may well be, as the editor of this journal has suggested, that the psychological approach to identity 
cannot, in the end, trump the biological or bodily approach. But I’m not claiming that it does. What I 
am suggesting, and I acknowledge that I might still be challenged on this, is that we are able 
legitimately to avoid being forced to choose between these views.  
8
 Kripke, fn. 56, p.114  
9
 Kripke,  p.113.   
10
 I’m assuming here that something originating from swan material would have various swan-like 
properties, and that a table made of ice would look like ice. But there are reasons for thinking that 
Kripke, at least, will want to deny there’s any necessity here. Even so, an assumption, well-founded or 
not, of qualitative differences will underpin these beliefs about identity differences.  And see Lynne 
Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)  p.32 n.18 for some 
discussion of this. 
11
 Kripke,  fn. 57, pp.114 -115  
12
 Does Kripke agree? Just as he is generous in the changes he allows to be possible, he seems to be 
generous, too, in relation to identity: ‘…there is no contradiction in the announcement that the Queen, 
this thing we thought to be a woman, was in fact an angel in human form, or an automatom….’ p.111. 
Yet you might think that to discover these things is to discover there is no queen. But then if the angel 
or automaton has the appropriate regal characteristics, maybe it can be allowed that he, or it, is the 
queen, nevertheless.  
13
 So I’m distinguishing here, as I need to, between originating and essential properties. Consider the 
embryo from which I developed – even granting the origin principle, it isn’t an essential property of me 
that I contain now the originating material. And see Parfit’s endnote 6  (p.522) for related points.  
14
 Notice there is no straightforward correspondence here.  We won’t say, so long as it is the same kind 
of thing , it remains the same individual.  A potter at his wheel can transform a vase not only into a 
plate, but into a different vase. And, at least magically, I could be turned either into a goat, or into a 
different person. Should we say, if something becomes a different kind of thing, it becomes a different 
individual? It might seem we should deny this. Bottom becomes an ass, but remains Bottom. Similarly 
for the narrator of Kafka’s Metamorphosis.  And, at least magically, the queen could become a swan, 
but remain queenly inside. But suppose it is agreed that we fall, normally, under two kinds - human 
animal, and person.  Then in these cases it seems that the human disappears while the person remains. 
And, post-transformation, neither the ass, the beetle nor the swan is a non-human animal through and 
through. 
15
 Parfit, p. 352. 
                                                                                                                                       
16
 Neither author is entirely clear. Parfit acknowledges (p. 352) the need to revise for twins, but seems 
to think that thereafter it will be true. Kripke makes an interesting comment in his long footnote 57: ‘I 
might have been deformed if the fertilized egg from which I originated had been damaged in certain 
ways, even though I presumably did not yet exist at the time’. So certainly substantial differences 
won’t always threaten identity. Whether they sometimes will is left open. 
17
  And so (and this is somewhat at odds with Kripke’s position) I have sympathy with those who claim 
that their disability is essential to their identity, and that had the disability been removed before birth, 
they would not have existed. See my ‘Identity and Disability’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (2000) 
pp. 265-276 
18
 There are in fact two views here. On the first, the queen acquires various swan-like properties at 
some stage. On the second she becomes a swan, and later becomes the queen again.  This view assumes 
that the very same thing can go out of, and come back into existence. Some have found that 
problematic. 
19
  Kripke,  fn. 56. p.114 
20
 I’m using these terms, ‘original’ and ‘duplicate’ to distinguish, I hope clearly enough, between the 
two tables, without wanting to imply either any temporal priority or any overt intention to copy. And 
similarly throughout the discussion that follows. 
21
  The diagrams here are very similar to those used by John Mackie in an early discussion of Kripke’s 
position in his Problems from Locke (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1976) pp. 152-155. I am grateful to 
Andrew Ward for pointing out the resemblances. 
22
  Bernard Williams ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’  in Problems of the Self  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973) 1-18, pp. 7-11 
23
 Parfit, p.355 
24
 And we might consider further the situation when there are two. Williams insists, when Charles and 
Robert  put in their equal claims, that it is here ‘quite obvious  that the idea of identity cannot be 
applied, and that we must fall back on  similarity’.24  But while it’s obvious that there are two distinct 
human organisms here, little else is obvious.  We either say, in this admittedly bizarre case, that 
Charles and Robert have both ceased to exist, with each replaced by similar but nevertheless distinct 
persons,  or we say that one person  - Guy – now occupies two locations, or we say, with Williams, that 
Charles and Robert continue to exist, even though both are much changed. These are the main, 
although there are further, options. It’s hard to see why the facts of the case should require us to favour 
one response over the others. But I’ve no need to press this point here.  
25
 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1981) pp.29-70 
26
 Bernard  Williams, ‘Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity’ in Problems of the Self, pp.19-25 
27
 What needs to be noticed here, I think, is that Williams’ argument, if it works at all, undermines the 
entire notion of identity across time. I am the same person I was yesterday. But it’s conceivable that my 
body should have divided, amoeba like, during the night. If it had, then the two resulting people would 
have been non-identical, and so neither would have had a good claim to be yesterday’s person. And the 
                                                                                                                                       
possibility of its in this way dividing challenges my claim to survive a good night’s sleep, even when 
nothing untoward happens.  But that can’t be right. 
28
  One question here is whether supporters of that account are thereby committed to challenging the 
necessity of identity thesis. I am so far agnostic on this. See Nozick’s discussion in his very length 
footnote 9 (pp. 656-9) for much more on this. 
29
 See Nathan Salmon, Reference and Essence (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982) pp.196-216 for this, and for 
further points. And for a related discussion see E. J. Lowe, Survey of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). pp.103-106. 
30
  There remains much more to say about both arguments, and about the similarities and differences 
between them. And although the position outlined above is, I believe, broadly correct I would, were 
there space, want to introduce a number of refinements and qualifications. Just one example: suppose 
Charles and Robert both exist  - or at least that their bodies still exist -  and make equally compelling 
claims to be Guy. Neither claim goes through. Robert is then, for unrelated reasons, killed. Though the 
Charles-body person is now Guy’s closest continuer I have doubts about whether he is now Guy. So 
while a merely possible Robert won’t stand in Charles’ way, a once, but no longer, actual Robert 
perhaps will. 
31
 There’s a similar situation concerning a jug. The potter makes a vessel from one lump, a handle from 
another, sticks them together, forms a lip and the jug is made. Could this jug have had a different 
handle and yet remained the same jug? Intuition, I think, says yes. And Kripke’s argument suggests 
nothing to the contrary. 
32
 See Christopher Belshaw,   ‘Asymmetry and Non-Existence’ Philosophical Studies, 70 (April 1993) 
pp. 103-116 and ‘Later Death/Earlier Birth’  Midwest Studies in Philosophy – Life and Death: 
Metaphysics and Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000) pp.69-83 
33
 It is, admittedly, much harder to imagine this in my own case, where the environment was from the 
outset of a complexity that would be hard to replicate. So principle is here being stretched.  
34
  David Hershenov, Steve Holland, Gary Kemp and Andrew Ward have all helped me immensely 
with this paper and its contents. My thanks go to them. 
